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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
AMERICAN FORK CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20000775-O
vs.
Priority No. 2

CHRISTIAN C.F. LEE,
Defendant/Appellee.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the continued seizure of Lee and the warrantless search of Lee's vehicle

was justified under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
§ 14 of the Utah Constitution?
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the trial court's factual findings
are reviewed for clear error while its legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness.
State v. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990). Likewise, the trial court's
ultimate decision that the consent was voluntary or involuntary is also reviewed for
correctness. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993).
This issue was preserved in a motion to suppress and a suppression hearing (R. 1819; 48-58; 84).

1

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
American Fork City appeals from the order of dismissal and order of suppression

of the Honorable Howard H. Maetani, Fourth District Court, American Fork Department.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Christian Lee was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court, American

Fork Department, on or about November 12, 1999, with Driving under the Influence of
Alcohol, a class B misdemeanor; Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class B
misdemeanor; and Possession of Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (R. 4-5).
On January 3, 2000, Lee filed a Motion to Suppress requesting the suppression of
evidence on grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution (R. 18-19; 48-58).
On March 31, 2000, a suppression hearing was held before the Honorable Howard H.
Maetani (R. 84). After the submission of proposed findings and conclusions, Judge
Maetani granted Lee's ordered the suppressio of the evidence and the dismissal of the
charges against him (R. 60-66; 71).
On September 1, 2000, American Fork City filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth
District Court (R. 77).

2

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On November 5, 1999, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Officer Cory Smith of the
American Fork Police Department, conducted a traffic stop on a dark colored truck for
speeding and running a stop sign (R. 84 at 3-5). Smith approached the driver of the
vehicle, who was identified as Christian Lee by a Utah driver's license (R. 84 at 6).
Smith also observed a bluejacket sitting on the back of the truck which had the words
"POLICE" written in white/yellow letters on the back of it (R. 84 at 6-7).
Smith then returned to his vehicle and wrote a traffic citation (R. 84 at 6). Another
officer arrived on the scene (R. 84 at 7). Smith finished the citation and again
approached Lee (R. 84 at 7). According to Smith, he had Lee sign the citation and gave it
to him along with his driver's license (R. 84 at 7, 23).l According to Lee, Smith had him
sign the citation but never gave it or his driver's license back to him (R. 84 at 25).
Although Smith (or any other officer to his knowledge) had received no reports or
complaints of any attempts by anyone of impersonation of a police officer prior to the
stop of Lee's vehicle (R. 84 at 16), and although Smith never observed Lee do anything
with the jacket which would give him reason to believe that he was going to impersonate
a police officer (R. 84 at 17), Smith questioned Lee about the jacket (R. 84 at 7, 15-16).
Lee informed Smith that the jacket came from afriendand that neither he nor the friend
were police officers (R. 84 at 7). Smith asked if Lee had any other police paraphernalia
and Lee responded in the negative (R. 84 at 8). Smith then asked for consent to search
the vehicle and Lee consented (and told Smith that he could take the jacket if he desired)
(R. 84 at 8).
^mith initially, however, testified on cross-examination that he was in possession of
both the citation and Lee's drivers license when he questioned Lee about the jacket (R. 84
at 16).
3

Smith had Lee step out of the vehicle (R. 84 at 8). Smith then reached into the
vehicle and removed the jacket; and as he did so, he smelled the odor of marijuana from
inside the vehicle (R. 84 at 8). Smith then retrieved his K-9 for a more detailed search of
the vehicle and the dog found marijuana and paraphernalia in the middle console of the
truck (R. 84 at 9-10). While Smith searched the vehicle, Lee stood outside over on a
grassy area by Smith's vehicle with Officer Holland (R. 84 at 8).
Smith then placed Lee under arrest (R. 84 at 11). As he did so, Smith noticed an
odor of alcohol on Lee (R. 84 at 11). Smith and Holland performed field sobriety tests on
Lee which showed impairment (R. 84 at 11-12). Smith observed no impairment by Lee
nor noticed any odors emanating from the vehicle prior to the search of the truck (R. 84 at
21). Lee was charged with driving under the influence, possession of marijuana and
possession of paraphernalia, all class B misdemeanors.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Lee asserts that the trial court correctly concluded that the warrantless search of
his vehicle constituted an illegal and unjustifiable search under the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution. Specifically,
Lee asserts the following: One, that the trial court correctly concluded that the continued
detention of Lee while he was asked questions about the jacket and to consent to the
search of his truck exceeded the scope of any permissible detention and was unsupported
by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that was independent of the initial detainer.
Two, that Lee's consent to the search of his truck was not attenuated from the illegal
detention. Three, that the warrantless search of Lee's truck was not justified under an
"officer safety" exception to the Fourth Amendment's protections. Finally, Lee asserts
4

that the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion that there was a Fourth Amendment
violation which required suppression of all evidence obtained from the continued
detention of Lee and the search of his truck is correct and that the subsequent dismissal of
the charges against him based on the suppression of the evidence should be affirmed by
this Court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF LEE'S VEHICLE CONSTITUTED
AN ILLEGAL SEARCH THAT CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED
UNDER AN EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S
PROHIBITION AGAINST SUCH SEARCHES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the
Utah Constitution guarantee individuals the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. "Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure'
within the meaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth] Amendments....55 State v. Case, 884
P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99
S.Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979)). While an individual has "a lesser expectation of privacy in a
car than in his or her home, one does not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment
while in a vehicle.55 State v. Schlosser, 114 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). Nevertheless,
it is this lessor expectation of privacy that has resulted in an "automobile exception55 to
the warrant rule which allows officers the ability to "temporarily detain a vehicle and its
occupants upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the purposes of conducting a
limited investigation of the suspicion.55 State v. James, 2000 UT 80 at 1[10, 13 P.3d 576.
In reviewing the legality of a traffic stop this Court must consider two questions:
"[W]hether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was
5

reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place." State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed. 889 (1968)). The inquiry as to the
first question focuses on whether the stop was "incident to a traffic violation committed
in the officer's presence." State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1991). Lee
concedes that Smith was constitutionally justified in initiating stopping his vehicle for
investigation of speeding and running a stop sign.
The focus of the second question is "whether the stop was reasonably related in
scope to the traffic violation which justified it in the first place." State v. Hansen, 2000
UT App 353 at Tfll, 17 P.3d 1135, cert granted, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001) (citing
Patefield, 927 P.2d at 657). "Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'"
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). In addition both the
"length and scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied to amd justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761,
763 (Utah 1991) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1868). Lee asserts that the
American Fork police exceeded the permissible scope of the detention and that the trial
court was correct in its conclusion that all evidence obtained as a result of the search of
Lee's truck must be suppressed because they were obtained by an unlawful detention
unsupported by reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity.

A.

The police lacked reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity and
exceeded the scope of any permissible detainer.
Once, the purpose of the initial stop was effectuated, the police were obligated to

release Lee from his detention and allow him "to proceed on his way, without being
6

subject to further delay by police for additional questioning." State v. Robinson, 797
P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted). Moreover, any "[i]nvestigative
questioning that further detains the driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of
more serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific,
articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer[s] at the
time of the stop." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132.
Lee asserts that the trial court was correct in its conclusion that the purpose of the
initial stop was effectuated when he signed and received the citation for the traffic
offenses; and that he should have been allowed "to proceed on his way without being
subject to further delay" by the officers for additional investigative questioning.
Accordingly, because Lee continued to be seized by the officers, any additional
questioning by the officers subjected him to further delay and had to be supported by
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Lee asserts that the trial court
correctly concluded that Officer Smith lacked reasonable suspicion that Lee was engaging
in other, more serious criminal activity, based on the totality of the circumstances.
Specifically, Lee asserts that the trial court correctly concluded that "[I]t is not a crime to
have possession of a jacket with the word "POLICE" on it. Nor does possession of such
a jacket mean that a crime is about to be committed" (Findings of Fact & Conclusions of
Law at 3, f 3).
One, there was no evidence or reports that Lee (or anyone else in the area) was
engaging in, or attempting to engage in, the crime of impersonating an officer (R. 84 at
16). Two, Officer Smith testified that he did not observe Lee do anything with the jacket
which would give him reason to believe that he was actually intending to impersonate a
police officer (R. 84 at 17).
7

Three, the crime of impersonating a police officer requires more than mere
possession of a jacket with the words "POLICE" written on it. For a conviction under
Utah Code Annotated § 77-7-15(3) one must impersonate a peace officer with intent to
deceive or induce; falsely state that one is a peace officer with intent to deceive or induce;
or possess or display police paraphernalia with the intent to deceive or induce another to
submit to his pretended authority. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in its
conclusion that without evidence of actual impersonation, or possession of police
paraphernalia with intent to deceive or induce another to submit or rely on his pretend
authority, any suspicion of criminal activity was not reasonable (Findings of Fact &
Conclusions of Law at 4, f4).
If this Court concludes that the trial court erred and the police only need evidence
which could possibly establish one element of a multi-element statute in order to have
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, then police would have virtually
unbridled discretion to stop, further detain, or even search, individuals where it is very
likely that no criminal activity has been, or is being, engaged in. For example, if an
officer observed an individual walk into a department store, select a garment, and proceed
to a dressing room where the garment is placed on the individual, does the officer then
possess a reasonable, articulable suspicion of retail theft sufficient to justify the stop or
continued detention of that individual for investigative questioning? Retail theft, like
impersonation of a peace officer, is a multi-element statute and one essential element is
that a person "takes possession of, conceals, carries away, transfers, or causes to be
transferred, any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail
mercantile establishment." Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-602.

8

Another example is possession of a firearm in a vehicle. In State v. Chapman, 921
P.2d 446 (Utah 1996), the Supreme Court found that mere possession of a firearm in a
vehicle does not allow an officer, with no other evidence available, to continue to detain
an individual for questioning-or to run a computer check on the gun to determine if it is
stolen-simply because one of the elements of the crime of possession of a stolen firearm
is met by the discovery of a firearm in the individual's vehicle.
Accordingly, Lee asks that this Court find that the trial court correctly concluded
that the officers exceeded the scope of any permissible detainer when they continued to
detain and question Lee without reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity once the
purpose of the initial stop was effectuated. In addition, the evidence produced before the
trial court establishes that other than the presence of the "POLICE" jacket, the officers
had no suspicions of any other criminal activity at the time Lee was impermissibly
detained. Neither Officer Smith nor Holland had any suspicions that Lee was operating a
vehicle while impaired or that he was in possession of marijuana: It was not until after
Smith questioned Lee about the jacket and reached into the truck to retrieve the jacket
that he had any suspicion of other criminal activity R. 84 at 8-10, 21). Therefore, the trial
court correctly ruled that all evidence was obtained as a result of this continued illegal
seizure and must be suppressed.

B,

Lee's consent to the search of his vehicle was obtained by police exploitation of
a prior illegality.
A warrantless search is only permissible under the Fourth Amendment if the State

can establish that it falls within one of the "few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions." State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (citation
omitted). One of said established exceptions is consent. Id. However, "[A] defendant's
9

consent to search following illegal police activity is valid under the Fourth Amendment
only if both of the following tests are met: (i) The consent was given voluntarily, and (ii)
the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." Hansen, 2000
UT App 353 at ^ 18 (quoting Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262). Lee asserts that his consent to
the search of his bag was obtained by Officer Smith's "exploitation of a prior illegality."
State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 4335 440 (Utah App. 1996).
Lee asserts that any consent he gave to the search of his truck is not
constitutionally valid because it was obtained through police exploitation of prior
misconduct. Lee has already established that the trial court correctly concluded that his
continued detention once he was cited for the initial traffic violations exceeded the scope
of any constitutionally permissible detainer because it was unsupported by reasonable
suspicion of other criminal activity. "If voluntary consent follows police misconduct, the
[City] must establish 'the existence of intervening factors which prove that the consent
was sufficiently attenuated from the police misconduct. Ham, 910 P.2d at 440.
Factors this Court must examine in regards to this issue are: One, the temporal
proximity of the initial illegality and the consent in question. Two, the presence of
intervening circumstances. Three, the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal misconduct.
Ham, 910 P.2d at 440 (citations ommitted). Lee asserts that all of these factors weigh
against attenuation in this case.
One, the proximity between the illegal detention after he had been cited for the
traffic violations and his consent to search is very short. Almost contemporaneous to the
time Lee was given the citation and should have been free to leave, Smith continued his
detention of Lee and engaged in investigative questioning-which included a request to
search his truck (R. 84 at 7-8, 15-16).
10

Two, like the facts in Ham, there were "absolutely no intervening" circumstances
between the illegal detention and the consent. 910 P.2d at 441.
Three, Lee asserts that the purpose of the continued illegal detention—and the
purpose of Smith's desire to search the bag—was an obvious attempt to find evidence that
Lee was involved in other criminal activity without any reasonable suspicion or probable
cause.
Based upon these facts, Lee asks that this Court conclude that his consent was not
attenuated from the illegal detention and Officer Smith's misconduct and that it cannot be
used by the City to validate the warrantless search of Lee's truck.

C.

The continued detention of Lee and the subsequent search of his vehicle cannot
be justified under an "officer safety" exception to the Fourth Amendment.
In its brief the City alludes to the notion that the police were justified in their

continued detention of Lee because the presence of the "POLICE" jacket created a safety
concern for the officer because the presence of the jacket could signal the presence of a
weapon (Br. of Appellant at 14). However, the City did not raise this issue in the trial
court and has therefore, waived the issue on appeal.
Nonetheless, Lee asserts that the continued detention of him, and the subsequent
search of his vehicle, cannot be justified under the Fourth Amendment pursuant to an
"officer safety" exception. Under the holding in Terry v. Ohio, and its progeny, afriskor
search for weapons for officer safety following an investigatory stop is constitutionally
permissible if: One, a police officer observes unusual conduct which is interpreted in
light of his experience as an indication of possible criminal activity and present danger;
and two, there is nothing in the initial stages of the encounter which serves to dispel the

11

officer's reasonable fear for his own or other's safety. State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 660
(Utah App. 1993) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884).
Lee asserts that Smith's continued seizure of him and the warrantless search of his
truck was not supported by "reasonable and articulable suspicion" that he was presently
dangerous or that there were weapons present. State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132, 1135,
1137-38 (Utah 1989). Accordingly, the search of his bag was not justified as under the
"officer safety" exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against warrantless
searches.
One, "nothing about the nature of the underlying offense being investigated
prompted a conern for safety... [and] nothing [Lee] did, by way of conduct, attitude or
gesture, suggested the presence of a weapon." State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 454
(Utah 1996) (quoting Orme, J. dissenting in Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 732 (Utah App.
1992)). The underlying offenses consisted of two benign traffic violations. In addition,
the evidence established nothing about Lee's demeanor or conduct which suggested the
presence of a weapon.
Three, if Smith really feared for his safety because of the mere presence of the
"POLICE" jacket, he would have immediately questioned Lee about the jacket at and the
presence of weapons at the beginning of the traffic stop, or would have immediately had
Lee exit the car and conducted a Terry frisk. Instead, Smith noticed the jacket, gathered
identification from Lee, and returned to his vehicle to prepare a citation without doing
anything about the presence of the jacket.
Accordinlgy, Smith's continued seizure of Lee and the warrantless search of his
truck was not supported by "reasonable and articulable suspicion" that he was presently
dangerous or that there were weapons present; and therefore, the search and seizure
12

cannot be justified under an "officer safety" exception to the Fourth Amendment.
Schlosser, 11A P.2d at 1135, 1137-38.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Lee asks that this Court affirm the decision of the trial
court suppressing the evidence and dismissing the charges against him because the
American Fork police exceeded the scope of their permissible seizure of Lee without
reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity. Lee also asks that this court conclude that
any consent by Lee to the search of his vehicle was not attenuated from the misconduct of
the police; and that the mere presence of a "POLICE" jacket does not justify the
continued seizure of Lee and the search of his vehicle based on an "officer safety"
exception to the Fourth Amendment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jjfc day of August, 2001.

MargarerP. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellee to James "Tucker" Hansen, American Fork City Attorney, 306 West
Main Stree, American Fork, Utah 84003 this (LL day of August, 2001.
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PATRICK V. LINDSAY (#8309)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
2 Attorneys for Defendant
43 East 200
North
,, ,r
:3 PCI Box' L
Provo, UT 84603-0200
4 Telephone: 373-4912
1

5

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

6

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

7

MUNICIPAL DIVISION - AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT

8

AMERICAN FORK CITY,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

9

Plaintiff,
10
vs.

11

CHRISTIAN C.F. LEE,

Civil No. 995101222

12

Defendant.

Judge: Howard H. Maetani

13
14

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court,

15

having received and reviewed the Motion, including memorandum in support, memorandum in

16

opposition, and having reviewed the applicable law, now enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT

17
18

1.

The Court finds that on November 5, 1999 at approximately 9:30 p.m., Officer Cory

19

Smith of the American Fork Police Department was on patrol in the vicinity of 300 North

20

100 West in American Fork City.

21

2.

The Courtfindsthat Officer Smith observed a dark colored truck turn left and travel West

22

on 300 North. Officer Smith observed the truck fail to stop at the stop sign located at the

23

intersection of 100 West 300 North. Officer Smith then observed the vehicle accelerate

24

to about 50 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone and obtained a radar reading of 50

>5

miles per hour.

The Courtfindsthat based on these observations, Officer Smith stopped the vehicle an
approached it.
The Court finds that as he approached the vehicle, Officer Smith observed a blue jack*
on the driver's seat that had the words "POLICE" written in white letters on the back c
it.

The Courtfindsthat Officer Smith identified the driver as the Defendant, Christian C.1
Lee and proceeded to cite him for speeding.
The Courtfindsthat after writing the speeding ticket and handing it to the Defendant, bi
before returning the Defendant's license to 'him, Officer Smith asked Defendant about tl
jacket with the police lettering, and asked if Defendant was a police officer.
The Courtfindsthat the Defendant replied that he was not, that he had received the jack
from a friend who was also not a police officer.
The Courtfindsthat Officer Smith then asked the Defendant why he had the jacket, ai
Defendant replied that he did not know.
The Court finds that Officer Smith then, without observing anything else that cou
suggest an unlawful reason or motive for possessing the jacket, including no reports tt
Defendant or others in the recent past has been involved with impersonating a poli
officer, proceeded to ask Defendant if there was anything else in the vehicle, a
Defendant replied no.
The Court finds that Officer Smith then asked Defendant for permission to search t
vehicle which the Defendant gave.
The Courtfindsthat as Officer Smith removed the jacket from the vehicle, he smelled 1
odor of marijuana.

2

1

12.

2
3I

believed to be marijuana and paraphernalia.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters the following

4
5

The Court finds that a subsequent K-9 search of the vehicle revealed what the officer

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

It is well established law in the State of Utah that: "(1) an officer may approach a citizen

6

at any time and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2)

7

an officer may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person

8

ha committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be temporary

9

and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer

10

may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been

11

committed or is being committed." State v. Deitman. 739 P.2nd 616 (Utah 1987).

12

2.

13
14

Officer Smith seized the Defendant when he pulled the Defendant over for a speeding
violation. Initially the stop was clearly justified and classified as a level-two detention.

3.

The prosecution argues that when the officer saw the "POLICE" jacket located in the

15

Defendant's vehicle that it gave the officer reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant and

16

investigate further for possible crime. The court disagrees, for the officer's suspicion

17

must be reasonable. It is not a crime to have possession of a jacket with the work
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"POLICE" on it. Nor does the possession of such jacket mean that a crime is about to
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be committed. There was not evidence or reports of the Defendant or anyone else in the
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area engaging or attempting to engage in the crime of impersonating an officer. Once the
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stop was made, the detention should have been temporary and should have lasted no
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longer than was necessary to effectuate the stop. "If there is investigating questioning
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that detains the driver beyond the scope of the initial stop, it must be supported by
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1

reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means

2

suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances

3

facing the officer at the time of the stop." State v. Lopez. 873 P2d 1127, 1132 (Utah

4

1994).
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4.

Furthermore, to be guilty of the crime of impersonating an officer the person not onlj

6

needs to display or possess articles or objects associated with the police, but he must hav«

7

the intent to deceive another person or to induce another to submit to or rely on hi;

8

pretended authority. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-8-512(3). Officer Smith did nothing mon
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than see the jacket in question. There was no evidence of intent, which is essential for th<

10

crime in question to be committed or about to be committed. Therefore, the officer die

11

not have reasonable articulable suspicion to investigate the Defendant any further than fo

12

purpose of the initial traffic violation.
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From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court now enters the following
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the Defendant's Motion t<
Suppress is hereby granted.
DATED this J(^~ day of August, 2000.
BY THE COURT:
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)WARD H^MAETANT
District Court Judge
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Approved as to Form:
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SCOTT WILLIAMS
American Fork City Attorney

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPT.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO. 995101222
DATE:7 JULY 11, '2000
JUDGE HOWARD H. MAETANI

AMERICAN FORK CITY,
Plaintiffs),
vs.
CHRISTIAN C.F. LEE,
Defendant(s).

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to
Suppress. The Court, having received and reviewed the motion, including memorandum
in support, memorandum in opposition, and having reviewed the applicable law, now
makes the following findings and conclusions:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Court adopts the Defendant's Findings of Fact.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
2. It is well established law in the state of Utah that: "(1) an officer may approach a
citizen at any time and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
the person has committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to
believe an offense has been committed or is being committed." State v. Deitman. 739
P.2d 616 (Utah 1987).
3. Officer Smith seized the defendant when he pulled the defendant over for a speeding
violation. Initially the stop was clearly justified and classified as a level-two
detention.
4. The prosecution argues that when the officer saw the "POLICE" jacket located in
defendant's vehicle that it gave the officer reasonable suspicion to detain defendant

and investigate further for possible crime. The Court disagrees, for the officer's
suspicions must be reasonable. It is not a crime to have possession of a jacket with
the word "POLICE" on it. Nor does the possession of such jacket mean that a crime
is about to be committed. There was no evidence or reports of the defendant or
anyone else in the area engaging or attempting to engage in the crime of
impersonating an officer. Once the stop was made, the detention should have been
temporary and should have lasted no longer than was necessary to effectuate the stop.
"If there is investigative questioning that detains the driver beyond the scope of the
initial stop, it must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal
activity. Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts
drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop."
State v. Lopez. 873 P2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994).
5. Furthermore, to be guilty of the crime of impersonating an officer the person not only
needs to display or possess articles or objects associated with the police, but he must
have the intent to deceive another person or to induce another to submit to or rely on
his pretended authority. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-8-512(3). Officer Smith did nothing
more than see the jacket in question. There was no evidence of intent, which is
essential for the crime in question to be committed or about to be committed.
Therefore, the officer did not have reasonable articulable suspicion to investigate the
defendant any further than for purpose of the initial traffic violation.
6. For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's Motion to Suppress is granted. Counsel
for the defendant to prepare an order consistent with this opinion, submit it to counsel
for city approval as to form and to the Court to execution.
Dated at American Fork, Utah this i±I_ day of July, 2000.

